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Introduction 
Epistemology, for so long, laid claim to being first philosophy and saddles itself with 
the responsibility of dealing with the foundation of scientific knowledge. However, the 
challenge to this claim, championed by proponents of naturalised epistemology, is that 
epistemologists should desist from handling epistemology as a normative, a priori, 
philosophical enterprise that seeks to evaluate the aims, procedures, and results of scientific 
inquiry. They would rather have epistemology treated as an arm of science that seeks to 
describe and explain how knowledge is acquired. Although, as has been rightly pointed out, 
one cannot address in one essay the entire project of naturalised epistemology (Code 1996, 1), 
we, in this essay, seek to examine the goal of naturalised epistemology directed at replacing the 
philosophical method of conducting epistemological inquiries with the scientific method.   
Our contention is that the proposal for naturalised epistemology undermines the 
importance of the methodology of conducting philosophical inquiries, and hence the 
philosophical treatment of that branch of philosophy that deals with the branch of philosophy 
that deals with the theory of the origin, nature and limits of knowledge, as well as the 
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importance of philosophical inquiry into science. We will further argue that the modification 
of the claim that rather than totally replacing epistemology with science, that what we should 
have is a collaboration between epistemology and science, in other words that the method of 
studying epistemology need only consider progress made in science, says nothing new that had 
not hitherto been accommodated. The essay, thus, considers why traditional epistemology, even 
if other means of analysing knowledge should emerge, will have to continue to evaluate human 
knowledge philosophically.  
The Naturalist’s Proposal about Epistemology 
The various genres of naturalised epistemology do not conceive the relationship that 
should exist between science and epistemology the same way. In fact, it makes more sense to 
speak of naturalised epistemologies rather than naturalised epistemology. This is because   
naturalism in philosophy is by no means as simple a doctrine as it appears at 
first sight. Because of inherent ambiguities and because of the curious turns 
in its recent evolution, it is not really one coherent philosophical theory. When 
two naturalists say the same, they do not (necessarily) mean the same. It 
should not be surprising, therefore, if one naturalist feels puzzled or even 
indignant when reading pages written by another (Giedymin 1972, 45).  
While to some proponents, science should entirely take over how epistemology is done, to 
others, epistemology need only take into consideration the method and findings of science. 
There is also disagreement as to which scientific discipline the study of epistemology should 
be modelled after. For Quine, for instance, it is psychology, while Code holds that it should be 
ecology (Code 1996). However, the scientific discipline that naturalists put forward as the 
model for epistemology matters less because there is a unity of the sciences. Regarding this, 
although these scientific disciplines differ in the specific objects they study, yet they share 
something in common and it is that:  
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scientists are brought together by their belief that their work will result in the 
discovery of verifiable facts. Physics and chemistry, biology and mathematics 
may differ in method and in the objects of their investigations, but physicists 
and chemists, biologists and mathematicians close ranks when asked to agree 
that their work share at least one feature: the discovery of the manifold 
properties of one and only one nature (Rota and Crant 2000, 475).  
What we have in all the sciences is the making and recording of observations about nature, or 
of simulations of nature, in order to learn more about how nature works.   
 In the light of this unity of the sciences, what advocates of naturalised epistemology that 
requires us to model epistemology after a particular scientific discipline are advocating is that 
there is need for the discovery of natural properties of, and veritable fact about, knowledge 
rather than reflectively aiming at the discoveries of ideals of knowledge. In the final analysis, 
the various naturalised epistemologies are lauded for the promise of shifting epistemology 
“away from idealised abstraction to established connections with epistemic practice that could 
enable theories of knowledge to engage constructively and critically with everyday cognitive 
activities” (Code 1996, 1).   
In the opinion of W.V.O. Quine, the progenitor of the idea, the attempt directed at 
finding the meaning and truths of science philosophically has failed. He seeks, therefore, to 
move the theory of knowledge into the field of psychology, where knowledge may be adjudged 
based on sensory input-output relationship of a person. Quine (1998, 260), thus, proposes that 
“epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and 
hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject.” 
Reducing epistemology to a branch of psychology and hence science, for Quine (1998, 256), is 
due to his belief that there are only two unassailable cardinal tenets of empiricism so far. “One 
is that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence.  
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The other… is that all inculcations of meaning of words must rest ultimately on sensory 
evidence….” Quine made this claim, most probably, because he believes that “people can 
survive only to the extent that they can process the information available from their 
environments, understanding their information processing capacities should yield an 
epistemology more adequate to human purposes than one that directs its recommendations 
towards an ideal of epistemic perfection that no human knower could achieve” (Code 1996, 3).  
Epistemology is, thus, reduced to the business of saying what psychological states a cogniser 
ought to be in in various circumstances, or the states it would be rational or intelligent for him 
to be in (Goldman 1978, 525). Advocates of naturalised epistemology are, therefore, neither 
committed  
to analysing what ideal knowers ought to do nor constrained to devoting their 
best efforts to silencing the sceptic, [instead] naturalists assume that 
knowledge is possible and seek to understand its real-world (natural) 
conditions. They abandon any quest for a priori, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge in general, to examine how epistemic agents 
actually produce knowledge, variously, within the scope and limits of human 
cognitive powers as these powers are revealed in the same projects of inquiry 
(Code 1996, 1).  
Although there are substantial differences between the various types of naturalised 
epistemology, yet the basic claim is that we should abandon the traditional treatment of 
knowledge as it had hitherto been done in traditional epistemology, which is speculative in 
nature. This is to be replaced with the empirical process of knowledge acquisition.  
Epistemologists are required “to understand how human beings generate their beliefs, how 
perception works, and how the brain processes sensory input. In other words, epistemology 
should be based, not on ideal abstract conditions, or on how we think we know based merely 
on introspection, but on the real processes of human perceiving and knowing” (Alcoef 1998, 
251).   
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This attempt of “scientisising” epistemology is not new in the history of scholarship, 
and it can be attributed to the arrogance that the scientific method is the method. As far as the 
scientific method is concerned, the pursuit of knowledge, has over time, been linked to it with 
so many disciplines appropriating the methodology of science because of the belief that this 
method is the sure and most reliable way to knowledge acquisition as well as the surest way of 
discovering nature’s secrets and how nature works through the discovery of laws and facts that 
reveal what nature is. It is this aim of this project that has been arrogantly extended to a cardinal 
branch of philosophy, epistemology. The belief informing this claim is that the attempt at 
understanding phenomena intuitively and speculatively has so far failed and therefore that “the 
method of natural science is the only legitimate or appropriate method to be used in attempting 
to acquire knowledge of whatever kind,” (Giedymin 1972, 45) or even in solving any human 
problem. This claim in itself may be traced to the realisation of what the scientific method had 
enabled humanity to achieve in its history. According to Kwasi  
Wiredu (1995, 136),  
as for the specific case of the superiority of scientific methods, the claim is 
based on such considerations as their greater efficacy in giving us control over 
various factors in our environment. And here it should be understood that the 
comparison is between methods of a certain kind of knowing not methods of 
living in general or even of knowing in general. That methods of inquiry based 
on exact measurement, controlled experiment and mathematical sophisticated 
theorising are superior to those based on ropemeasurement and uncodified 
memories of previous observations seems hardly debatable.  
The Nature of the Problems, the Methodology, and the Results of Philosophical Inquiry 
  According to Kwame Gyekye (1997, 3),  
the nature, purpose, methods, and relevance of philosophy are widely 
misunderstood. In consequence, philosophy has come to be burlesqued and 
travestied by most people outside this intellectual discipline. The 
misunderstanding or misconception has in some people matured into 
prejudice and resilient scepticism about the relevance of philosophy to public 
affairs in particular and human purpose in general.  
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As a result of the misconceptions about philosophy we now have situation in which 
philosophers are charged with preoccupying themselves with abstract theoretical concerns, 
with elitism, apriorism, and uninvolvement in the practical affairs of life. The result of these 
misconceptions on the part of nonphilosophers is that philosophy is seen as the quintessence of 
ivory towerism and irrelevance (Gyekye 1997, 3). It is not only nonphilosophers that have 
questioned the relevance of the philosophy enterprise. Professional philosophers have 
sometimes been involved in metaphilosophy requesting that we do away with parts of the 
discipline, for instance, metaphysics, or even contesting the relevance of certain methodologies. 
It is, thus, important to clear misconceptions and shed more light on what philosophy is. This 
is undertaken, here, in order to unearth the nature of the philosophy as a discipline and how this 
nature influences how epistemology is studied.  
Three factors have been identified as being responsible for conferring on disciplines 
their distinguishing features. These are: the nature and genesis of the problems they tackle or 
study; the accepted method of studying these problems and; the results that are hoped for and 
the method of evaluating the relative merits of propounded solutions (Bodunrin 1981, 13).  
In the case of philosophy, the problems tackled in philosophy are fundamental in nature. 
The questioning of the fundamental assumptions of life has since inception till date constituted 
the main essence of philosophy. It is a discipline that “refers to attempts on the part of serious 
thinkers to get at the basis of things. Not the superficial, trivial detail, but the underlying 
fundamentals” (Stewart and Blocker 1987, 3). Gyekye (1997, 5) rightly conceives philosophy 
essentially as critical and systematic inquiry into the fundamental ideas or principles underlying 
human thought, conduct, and experience, ideas, beliefs and assumptions. In this regard, G. M. 
Presbey, K. J. Struhl, and R. E. Olsen, have rightly held that, “philosophers go to the ‘root’ of 
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ideas by clarifying, questioning and evaluating our most basic assumptions. Often this 
challenge to accept norms and ideas can lead to views that are at odds with one’s culture…. 
Philosophy is, in short, a radical critical inquiry into the fundamental assumptions of any field 
of inquiry [idea, concept, belief], including itself” (Presbey et. al. 2000, xiv). In what ways are 
philosophical problems fundamental in nature? Answers Olusegun Oladipo (2008, 33-34), 
philosophical problems are fundamental in nature,   
first, because the answers to them, implicit or explicit, are at the basis of the 
beliefs in terms of which people organise their lives and social relations. In 
other words, they influence our judgements and actions in various ways. But 
these questions are fundamental in another sense, namely, the ramifications 
of the answers they elicit go beyond the purview of the concerns that 
immediately led to them to touch areas of life from which they appear to be 
quite remote.
  
Philosophers also address themselves to certain questions which are general in nature.  
By being general in nature is meant that these questions “are beyond the scope of specific areas 
of knowledge, for example, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, history, political science, 
and so on.” (Oladipo 2008, 20).  It entails also that, even though these problems had their origin 
in human experience, they cannot be tackled by resort to empirical methods. As  
Brooke Noel Moore and Kenneth Bruder (2002, 3) have rightly held “one important feature of 
philosophical questions is that they cannot be answered, in any straightforward way, by the 
discovery of some fact or collection of facts… facts are often relevant to a philosophical 
question, but they cannot themselves provide an answer” Oladipo also reiterates that these 
problems are not problems that can be tackled through the accumulation of facts. Instead, “they 
involve a careful consideration of how best to describe the facts that are available, with a view 
to generating insights about them, which although tentative, are, nonetheless, clear and self-
consistent.” (Oladipo 2008, 32-33).   
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Although scholars and professionals in the existing intellectual disciplines tackle quite 
a number of the questions that philosophers address themselves to, yet the pondering of a 
philosopher on these issues makes the philosopher consider these issues outside the purview of 
the limited scope of the professionals in those fields. The aim of philosophers, in addressing 
themselves to questions that are general in nature, as distinct from the specific ways the 
professionals in those fields address them, is directed at providing “a broad or general guide 
for perceiving, feeling and transforming reality” (Oladipo, 13).  
 Philosophers also address themselves to questions that deal with norms. “Normative questions 
ask about the value of something. The sciences are interested in finding out how things are, but 
they cannot tell us how things ought to be. When we decide that something is good or bad, right 
or wrong, beautiful or ugly, we are applying norms or standards” (Moore and Bruder 2002, 3). 
Epistemology shares in this nature of philosophy as do every other branch of the discipline. 
This is because epistemic terms are essentially normative and as such epistemology is itself a 
normative inquiry with the ultimate goal of ensuring systematic study of the conditions of 
justified belief (Kim 1998, 266-267).  
Finally, the problems that philosophy tackles are abstract in nature. This arises, in itself, 
because philosophical questions are general. Operating at this abstract level, offers the 
philosopher “a vantage point from which to beam her analytical searchlight on the inarticulate 
and woolly beliefs and thoughts of people” (Gyekye 1997, 6) The abstract nature of the 
problems philosophy tackles has erroneously made many to conclude that philosophy bears 
little or no relevance to the concrete and specific problems of humanity. Much has been said 
about the nature of the problems addressed in philosophy generally. Let’s briefly address 
ourselves to the nature of the problems addressed in epistemology, before considering the other 
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two factors that are responsible for conferring on philosophy its distinguishing features, seeing 
that each branch of philosophy deals with its own specific issues and problems.  
Michael Williams (2001) in his book, Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction 
to Epistemology, identifies five problems tackled in it as a cardinal branch of philosophy. The 
first is the analytic problem. This relates to clarifying what knowledge is and how knowledge 
is to be distinguished from mere belief and opinion. The second is the problem of demarcation. 
This, in itself is further divided into two, the external problem in which attempt is directed at 
determining, in a principled way, what sort of things we might reasonably know about, i.e. 
determining the scope and limits of human knowledge. The other division which addresses 
internal problems considers whether there are important boundaries within the province of 
knowledge itself. This is where the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge is 
discoursed.   
The Third relates to the problem of method. This deals with how knowledge is to be 
obtained or sought. This is further subdivided into three problems: the problem of unity, which 
seeks to know whether there is just one way of acquiring knowledge, or whether there are 
several, depending on the nature of the knowledge in question; the ameliorative problem, which 
considers the possibility of knowing if our means of acquiring knowledge can be improved on. 
The third subdivision deals with the problem of reason or rationality. Here, the concern is aimed 
at knowing whether there are methods of inquiry that are distinctively rational, and if so, what 
they are. The fourth is the problem of scepticism that addresses itself to whether it is possible 
to obtain knowledge at all. Finally, there is the problem of value which considers whether 
knowledge is worth having, why and what for? Williams’ conclusion is that how a given 
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philosopher judges the relative importance of these problems will shape the philosopher’s sense 
of what an epistemological theory needs to accomplish and  
how it might be argued for (Cf. Williams 2001, 1-3).  
Regarding the genesis of problems tackled in philosophy: they begin in wonder. As  
Aristotle says in his Metaphysics, “it is through wonder that men now begin and originally 
began to philosophise.” Plato reiterates in his Theaetetus also that “wonder is the special 
affection of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other starting point than this.” Human beings 
became perplexed upon noticing the baffling and contradictory features- change and 
permanence, life and death, universals and particulars- of the world. And as a result, men began 
to wonder what explanations there are to them and thus through wonder, philosophy kicked 
off. Still, philosophical issues have continued to be generated as a result of wonder, as a result 
of philosophers wondering whether better explanations do not exist other than the ones 
provided; as a result of philosophers wondering about the perplexities that arise out of 
conflicting and contradictory positions that philosophers, scholars, and humans generally put 
forward. In short, philosophy begins when one is puzzled by something and when as a result 
of wonder one begins to raise questions in the hope of finding answers.  
Another genesis of philosophical problem is doubt. “In the specific case of  
philosophical inquiry, the central motivation derives from the observation that things are not 
usually what they appear to be and the realisation that many of the assurances of common sense 
can be mistaken” (Oladipo 2008, 31-32) Because of the difference between the noumena and 
the phenomena, the way things are in themselves and the way they appear to us, philosophical 
reflection springs up in the bid to supply rational explanations to dispel doubt.  
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Although, the method of handling philosophical issues differ from tradition to tradition, 
from one philosopher to the other (and may even vary, depending on the issue handled by a 
philosopher at a particular time or epoch); and although “we cannot pinpoint a method as the 
philosophical method, the way we talk of scientific method, for instance,”30 the method of 
approaching philosophical problems include among others: conceptual reasoning or conceptual 
analysis, reflection, and speculation. In relation to its methodology, philosophy may be 
conceived as the discipline that subjects to rigorous examination the fundamental assumptions 
or issues of life. It is that discipline which engages its subject-matter, whatever it may be, in 
whatever field of knowledge by being critical, analytical, logical, argumentative, reflective, 
rational and normative. As a cognitive enterprise philosophy aims at the production of 
knowledge of some sort. Philosophy, thus, presents us with “a new interpretation and a new 
awareness of the basic assumption that underlie our everyday life.”31 It requires of us to 
question all things, challenge all assumptions and beliefs until we find beliefs that are 
sacrosanct.   
Unlike the situation in science where consensus on an issue is fundamental in resolving 
a nutty issue, in philosophy, the consensus of the community of philosophers may not be 
necessary. What is required of a philosopher is the presentation of arguments of high quality 
and clarity of expression. The acceptance of the point of view of the philosopher will depend, 
to a large extent, on the profundity and the logical force of the arguments put forward regarding 
an idea. Whether people, or other philosophers, accept the arguments depends on their 
intellectual outlook and ideological leanings. However, it is not the case that “in philosophy 
anything goes, that one can say anything and make any speculation that one likes. On the 
contrary, precisely because we lack established empirical or mathematical methods for 
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investigating philosophical problems, we have to be all the more rigorous and precise in our 
philosophical analyses” (Oladipo 2008, 11).  
These features reflect through every branch of philosophy in the interrogation of their 
subject matter either as first order disciplines or as second order ones that interrogate the aims, 
procedures and outcomes of other disciplines.  
The Nature of Philosophy and Its Concerns with the Discipline of Science 
We turn the focus of the discussion now to how the nature of philosophy as a discipline 
determines how it engages the discipline of science.  
According to H. S. Staniland, a person is engaged in philosophising if the person is 
engaged in a train of thought whose ultimate purpose is the criticism of certain vitally important 
ideas (Staniland 2000, 4). This opinion of Staniland, which defines philosophy as the criticism 
of the ideas we live by, rightly places the activity of criticism as an essential activity in the act 
of philosophising. Philosophy is a critical discipline. “An exercise is critical if and only if it 
avoids any kind of dogma however trivial” (Owolabi 2000, xi). In philosophy, we achieve our 
aim “by probing criticism- letting loose our entire intellectual activity in the consideration of a 
problem and pursuing our enquiry with a preparedness to abandon our most cherished beliefs 
if reason demands that we so do.” (Bodunrin 1981, 23). Philosophy as a discipline criticises 
received opinions- it is critical of views internal to its field of study and at the same time critical 
of views expressed in other fields of study. This critical nature of philosophy is directed at 
making clear all ideas in order to avoid the esoteric and the mystical and in order to provide the 
justification, where necessary, or refutation, as the case may demand in certain cases, for all 
beliefs and knowledge claims. In this regard, K. A. Owolabi (2000, x) posits that philosophy, 
avoids ideas that are mysterious, dogmatic and complicated. And that although philosophy 
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mingles with religion and science, it does this not for the purpose of adopting their subjects and 
methodology, but in order to supply rational arguments for the justification or rejection of those 
aspects that deserve either acceptance or rejection. Philosophy is, therefore, interested, as a 
second order enterprise, in interrogating how knowledge is acquired and justified in these other 
areas, as well as, in criticising and justifying the grounds of the knowledge claims made in other 
disciplines, including science. In relation to the discipline of science, philosophy is interested 
in the evaluation of scientific claims and or knowledge. Philosophy saddles itself with this 
responsibility because the philosophic spirit “leaves no valuations and aspirations unexamined 
and no piece of knowledge isolated; it seeks the grounds for the validity of whatever is valid” 
(Rickman, 1979, 129).   
Another defining feature of philosophy, apart from criticism, is scepticism. In line with 
its sceptical nature, philosophy challenges science’s knowledge claims and demands that we be 
not easily satisfied with simple or superficial scientific evidence. It demands that there is need 
to cast doubt on scientific claims and that unless certain criteria are met with that we should 
deny such claims. The reason why philosophy makes this demand is because science relies 
heavily for its claims on sense experience which is unfortunately prone to error. We do know 
from experience, for instance, that our senses (even when aided with instruments) are, in some 
cases, deceitful or unreliable. And inasmuch as this is true, we are cautioned in relying on them 
for deriving absolute certain knowledge of phenomena as they are, and beyond that, in 
predicting the future. In the light of the above description of philosophy, we will proceed in 
evaluating the mission of those who have argued for the severing of epistemology as a cardinal 
branch of philosophy, just as other branches of knowledge, with developed methodologies, 
have over time been severed from philosophy.  
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Should Science be the Method? 
 
One of the reasons for the naturalist’s proposal for replacing traditional ways of 
addressing epistemological issues with the methodologies of science is that traditional 
epistemology has failed to achieve certainty. However, to us, certainty is definitely elusive to 
man. To err is human, and the fact remains that in all human endeavours errors occur, more so 
in science. Wiredu has rightly concluded that: “knowledge, whether it be a priori or empirical 
or about necessary or contingent propositions, can have only a certainty compatible with human 
fallibility. In every case it is bound to the conditions of human existence, biological and 
cultural” (Wiredu 1995, 146). This is the reason why explanations, theories and laws change in 
science. Since change is the one constant thing in nature (change, not necessarily in the sense 
that nature itself changes but that our understanding of nature changes), scientific claims, 
knowledge, and theories can only at best be transitory since “what we say about reality is the 
product of certain orientation of being, certain interest, certain motivation, our individual will 
and arbitrariness” (Unah 2004, 63) Scientific claims, knowledge, and theories are susceptible 
to change. This is why scientists in their efforts to provide a better understanding of nature 
constantly attempt to make new discoveries and develop new concepts, laws and theories, that 
better enhance our understanding of natural phenomena. In doing this, scientists attempt to 
dislodge or modify old explanatory models by causing paradigm shift. Of a truth then, “the 
precision and the reliability of mathematics and the experimental sciences seem to make these 
the definitive types of knowledge,” says Rosen, “even though it would be difficult to say that 
such knowledge is unchangeable” (Rosen 2000, xiv). Gregory N. Derry (1999, 4), therefore, 
rightly posits, “this body of scientific results changes from year to year, and may sometimes be 
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unrecognizable from one generation to another.”41 Oladipo makes the same point when he 
posits that:  
our knowledge of the world, in spite of the giant strides that has been taken 
by science in the growth of knowledge, is still limited, just as the resources- 
spiritual, intellectual and moral- available to us for coping with the challenges 
of life are characteristically inadequate. Given this situation, the ideas and 
ideals- core aspects of world-views- we live by are best regarded as tentative 
guides, which can be re-examined from time to time in the light of new 
knowledge or information and our understanding of our sociocultural 
condition and its existential demands at any given time (Oladipo, 16).  
Given the fact that the specialised knowledge possessed by scientists is highly fallible 
leading to a situation in which today’s scientific knowledge may turn out to have been today’s 
scientific error, philosophy needs to scrutinise the claims in the sciences in order to eliminate 
erroneous beliefs. Science as a body of imperfection can hence not be taken as the paradigm 
for attaining the normative aim of the philosopher in arriving at what knowledge is indeed. 
Gyekye rightly hold then, “that philosophy speculates about the whole range of the human 
experience: it provides conceptual interpretation and analysis of that experience, necessarily 
doing so not only by responding to the basic issues and problems generated by that experience 
but also by suggesting new or alternative ways of thought and action” (Gyekye 1997, 24). 
Indeed then, the philosophical quest for absolute certainty, for perfection, is not out of place. It 
is a reminder that we can be better than we are, that there are lofty heights of ideals yet to be 
attained and the search for which we must not relent. That philosophical quest, hence, keeps 
the insatiable human spirit searching, researching and further researching for the perfection, 
which according to Plato, resides in the world of forms. At the heart of this search is the 
conviction that certainty, absolute truth, is radically different from human’s opinion or 
judgement of it.  
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Furthermore, given the fact that there is a distinction between appearance and reality, 
there is cause for the philosopher to question the scientist as to whether the later had really dealt 
with reality of a phenomenon in itself or its appearance. This concern is justified in the light of 
the view expressed by Agnostic Materialism that holds that even though ultimate reality is 
material in nature, yet that even with all the advances in knowledge about matter, made possible 
by science now, we are still ignorant of its essential nature. The state of our ignorance cannot 
be eliminated totally, even in the future, given the fact that even the increase in our knowledge 
about the ultimate and fundamental reality in the future will not imply that we have laid hold 
of reality’s essential nature for there is more to matter than what  
human understanding can capture given the limitation of our conceptual scheme, the limitation 
of man’s devised measuring instruments of matter and the fact that we can only know the 
revealed aspect of matter. Although lengthy, permit us to quote how Raymond N.  
Osei captures this point. According to him,  
…though we have accumulated across the centuries a great deal of 
information about the underlying stuff and workings of this world- thanks to 
the advances in science- yet we are far from clear as regards the intrinsic 
nature of this reality. As contemporary philosophers remind us again and 
again, the question is not that it is a matter of time, and not the inadequacy of 
our conceptual systems (common sense and scientific), that accounts for our 
ignorance of this reality. It is true that in time we will come to acquire more 
knowledge of the workings of this ubiquitous stuff by deploying our existing 
conceptual systems (enriched by time and experience). Yet, in spite of these 
advances in the past and possible advances in the future, we despair that the 
basic structure of our present conceptual systems could in the final analysis 
reveal to us this reality. This scepticism is sustained by the fact that we have 
epistemic access to two distinct kinds of phenomena: the mental and the 
physical, or the experiential and the non-experiential; we also have strong 
intuition that there is an intimate relationship between the two phenomena; 
but our current conceptual systems seem wholly inadequate in offering a 
coherent account of this relationship. This is the perplexity that afflicts our 
human condition (Osei 2006, 9-10).  
Holding a similar view, Jim I. Unah (2004) has argued that reality is, on the one hand, 
multi-faceted and, on the other, perpetually in process. Being multi-faceted implies that reality 
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has many faces or many dimension, while being perpetually in process entails that reality is not 
localizable, meaning that reality is always unfolding itself, always more than what it is at any 
time. The implication of these, according to Unah (2006, 63), is that “there can be no adequate 
conceptualizations of it. If there can be no total conceptualization of it, there is always 
something left to see and say. There is always something to excite our ontological wonder, 
something to give rise to further questioning.”  
Moreover, since the knowledge expressed in science is a tentative expression of and 
partial understanding of the events and natural phenomena in our world, these expressions 
inevitably have their weaknesses and strength. It is the task of philosophy to expose the 
weaknesses and, if possible, further strengthen the area of strength.  
Furthermore, philosophy is interested in science in order to rein in the excesses of 
science. Science ought to look to philosophy, in one form or another, not simply for justification 
of its achievements or immense power but for insight into its legitimate purpose and its wise 
limitations (Rosen 2000, xxvi). Like a mother that keeps its children in check philosophy 
stimulates rich discourses about the values that ought to guide the discipline of science so that 
the discipline can indeed realise the highest good for humanity. To understand the importance 
of this interest of philosophy we should just evaluate the threat that unbridled development in 
science has contributed to environmental crisis in our world today, availability of weapon of 
mass destruction which increasingly makes chaos, calamity and destruction to stare humanity 
in the face. Olu-Owolabi (2011, 31) concludes on this issue that:  
With the feats of science in the modern age, scientific enterprise is allowed to 
have a field day and the philosophical wisdom that ought to be the guiding 
and directing force is therefore sent out of the arena of performance…. This 
is the situation of things today. Science is the performing dog; philosophy is 
the guardian-police. There is the need to bring in the philosophical enterprise 
with its attendant wisdom to temper the excesses of sciences.  
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  In the light of this, we are convinced that rather than having epistemology integrated 
into the discipline of science what we should seek to have is the dialogue of the disciplines.   
As Obafemi Kujore (1977, 19) had rightly noted, “certainly, in a properly conceived 
development of national character, scientific knowledge and technical expertise should go 
hand-in-hand with a well-adjusted sense of human values and a conscious discipline of 
character.” He further holds,  
… there is nothing to be gained in creating an unnecessary gap between the 
sciences and the humanities and in regarding both as implacable rivals; the 
sciences can, and should, be studied in a humanistic spirit, and the humanities 
can, and should, be cultivated in a scientific spirit. I believe also we can now 
realise that we do not stand to lose, but rather have much to profit from, by 
sharing the common and great experiences of the past of humanity (Kujore 
1977, 21).  
What is this common and great experience of the past of humanity, especially as it 
relates to the production of knowledge? It is that the production of knowledge at its inception 
did not suffer the kind of deficient demarcation now known in the generation of knowledge. 
The situation was such that the sciences (in the general understanding of the word) kicked off 
as philosophy. It is in the light of this that, the proposal of those who advocate a genre of 
naturalised epistemology that rejects the basic tenet of the Quinean type of epistemology that 
seeks to totally replace the philosophical inquiry into epistemology with scientific inquiry and 
would rather have us have an epistemology that takes cognisance of development in science 
says nothing new other than requiring us to return to the ancient track abandoned in 
contemporary scholarship.  
According to Quine (1968, 185), “knowledge, mind and meaning are part of the same 
world that they have to do, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical spirit that 
animates natural science. There is no place for a prior[i] philosophy.” The aim of the proponents 
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of naturalised epistemology that seeks to have epistemology as a branch of science, ignores the 
fact that science is a branch of knowledge and that just as it has a claim to its method of 
generating knowledge other branches of knowledge should equally be permitted to thrive on 
methodologies adjudged suitable for making progress in those disciplines, taking into 
cognisance the objects they study. We doubt, for instance, whether philosophical problems and 
issues can be solved by the empirical method for there is no amount of observation that can 
determine the knowledge about whether or not the universe has a purpose and whether, and in 
what sense, human beings have free will (Gyekye 1997, 7).  
We cannot agree less with Jerzy Gieldymin (1972, 53) that “knowledge, in the form of 
scientific and mathematical theories belongs to the world of ideas and is to be studied not with 
the methods of psychology but by analysing, developing and criticising the content of theories 
in relation to problems which are likewise susceptible to similar scrutiny….” This is best done 
in philosophy in the light of the qualities it possesses. John R. Searle has argued rightly, to 
some extent, that there is no sharp line of division between philosophy and science for both, in 
principle, are universal in subject matter and both aim at the truth. However, according to him,  
though there is no sharp dividing line, there are important differences in 
method, style and presuppositions. Philosophical problems tend to have three 
related features that scientific problems do not have. First, philosophy is in 
large part concerned with questions that we have not yet found satisfactory 
and systematic way to answer. Second, philosophical questions tend to be 
what I will call ‘framework’ questions; that is, they tend to deal with 
frameworks of phenomena, rather than with specific individual questions. 
And third, philosophical questions are typically about our concepts and the 
relationship between our concepts and the world they represent (Seale 1999, 
2070).  
In the final analysis, some things are not amenable to treatment scientifically. In fact, Quine’s 
claims were philosophically argued for and not scientifically proven. Says Andras Kertesz  
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(2002, 274), “the arguments which Quine puts forward in order to prove this conclusion is of 
exactly the same philosophical nature which characterised both scepticism and traditional 
epistemology.”  
It lies also within the power of philosophy to expose certain hidden ideologies driving 
certain scientific research and projects. In the case of Africa, for instance, there is a reason why 
philosophy needs to be involved in other disciplines and it is to ensure that ideological 
underpinnings of theories generated in other disciplines are properly examined in order to 
separate bad ideology from good ideology. As Oladipo (2008, 106) says,   
another aspect of the critique of ideology which African philosophers should 
not neglect is the critical engagement with other academic disciplines, 
whether in the social sciences, the humanities or even the natural sciences, as 
a way of exposing the ideological underpinnings of received, usually 
moribund, theoretical models or research programmes which are dominant in 
African academic establishments…. This kind of critique should be pursued 
more vigorously, given the widespread tendency in African academic 
establishments to regard received theoretical models or research programmes 
as ready-made tools which can only be applied, not examined.  
The philosopher must thus become critical of views presenting degrading 
misconceptions of Africa. Helen Lauer (2007, 121) has, for instance, criticised the false 
ideology of incapacity, which presents economic rehabilitation programmes based on the idea 
that Africa is a deficient continent. This, she says, presupposed a notion of economic maturity 
that connotes a unidirectional, asymmetric process of development according to fixed criteria 
of civilisation and which measures social progress by how a society approximates to the 
European ideal of cultural sophistication known as modernity even though the European model 
is not the only ideal operating model in the world.   
  The critical evaluation of ideologies underlying disciplines should enable humans to 
reject certain degrading notions about Africans, or any race whatsoever, which in line with 
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acclaimed scientific discoveries show the African, or any race whatsoever, to be inferior to 
others.   
Conclusion 
 
Although epistemology is a contested terrain- a contested terrain in that naturalised 
epistemologist are advocating that epistemology should be severed from apriori philosophy 
and placed under natural science- yet given the qualities philosophy possesses questions, 
problems and issues addressed in epistemology which are normative, general, fundamental and 
abstract in nature are best left in the care of philosophy and addressed with the speculative 
method of philosophy through in-depth conceptual analysis an reflection. This, however, 
should not detract us from making scientific inquiry into epistemic claims, issues or problems.  
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